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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 17/01/2004

Accident number: 26

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 28/07/1997

Where it occurred: Inchope - Gorangoza
Road km 8+800,
Sofala Province
Primary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Mozambique

Secondary cause: Other (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source:

Date of main report: 07/08/1997
Name of source:

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: AT (unrecorded)

Ground condition: route (verge), hard

Date record created: 17/01/2004

Date last modified: 17/01/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate metal-detector (?)

Accident report
A report compiled on behalf of the Country MAC, dated 7th August 1997, was made available.
The following summarises its content.
Prior to the demining company's operations at the site, other demining organisations had
undertaken other projects in the area. During their clearance the demining company found
one TM-46 (metallic) anti-tank mine and 44 PMNs. Two Pt Mi Ba III (minimum metal) anti-tank
mines were found by the road-building contractors and were detonated in-situ.
On the day of the accident a truck initiated a mine with its right front wheel as it turned onto
the verge to unload. The driver was sitting above the wheel that caused the detonation. He
escaped from the cab before it caught fire. He was taken to hospital but later discharged in
"good health". The blast wave threw the truck one-meter forward, destroyed the wheel and
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made the cab and front tyres catch fire. [Photographs indicate minimal blast damage to the
cab above the wheel arch – implying deflagration rather than detonation of the device, or an
incendiary/small blast device.]
The crater measured 1.5 metres by 0.4 metres and large plastic and rubber fragments were
found. These were taken to indicate that the mine was probably a TMA2 or a PT56 AT mine.
Neither mine, to the MAC's knowledge, had been found in Mozambique prior to the accident.
[The photographs were indistinct and the identification of the device highly suspect: the truck
burnt out completely but large parts of the mine case were not destroyed in the blast or
burned in the subsequent fire.]

Conclusion
The investigation concluded that a plastic anti-tank mine, laid at a depth of 20-25cm was
missed by the demining group during its clearance. The detectors the group used could not
detect the kind of mine suspected.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that the demining group's detectors should be replaced by
those with a higher sensitivity. Also that the road-building contractors should cease operations
due to the unacceptable risk of encountering other such mines. The demining group should
then recheck the cleared area with better equipment as soon as possible. All demining
organisations operating in Sofala and neighbouring Provinces should be informed about the
presence of a TMA2 or PT56 AT mine, and that demining organisations should be required to
provide the Country MAC with a list of all (types of) mines found.

Victim Report
Victim number: 40

Name: not recorded
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: driver

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: None

Protection used: none

Summary of injuries:

COMMENT
No formal record of the victim's injuries was made.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because
the demining group either did not clear the verge, or used a method incapable of locating the
threat. The secondary cause is listed as “Other” because it is uncertain what went on during
the demining work..
The researcher believes that a 7kg or a 5.5kg mine that detonated would have caused far
more extensive damage to the vehicle (which was mainly damaged by fire). Also, a
detonation of such a large amount of explosive would not have left large fragments of casing
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for the investigators to attempt to identify. If large pieces of casing were found, the device did
not detonate properly.
It is possible that the entire accident was a "sham", covering for an accidental fire in the
vehicle and subsequent insurance claim.

Related papers
A letter dated 28th July 1997 written by a representative of the road builders stated that the
mine was 5.7m from the centre of the road, and added that the driver was "seriously injured".
It also mentioned an accident on 22nd July 1997 when an AT mine was found in the same
road, and blown up (presumably by the road builders). No other evidence of injury was found.
A lengthy internal report, dated 3rd August 1997 was made in Portuguese by the demining
company. Salient points are that the accident occurred when an 18-ton truck hit a mine 5.75m
from the centre line at 6:30 on 28th July 1997 while it was turning around to dump gravel. The
explosion set diesel fuel alight, which completely destroyed the cab. The driver suffered only
minor injuries. On the 2nd June 1997 a smoke grenade had been found and destroyed 210m
from the site of the accident. On 4th June 1997 an "M969 anti-tank" [sic] mine was found and
destroyed 2.85km from the site of the accident. 14 live cartridges and many assorted pieces
of metal were also found in the area using the Ebinger 420 detector.
The demining company's management made a supposedly "scientific" assessment of the
accident and concluded that the explosion occurred 0.72m outside the area marked as clear
(acknowledging that it is normal to clear up to 0.87 beyond the marked area for the purpose of
putting in marking stakes). The formula C = K x M x n3 was applied to the explosion, from
which it was deduced that the mine must have contained a main charge of 7kg and have
been buried to a depth of between 0.25 and 0.3 metres. It is stated that the maximum depth
at which the mine could have been activated was 0.42m and that the normal depth to find an
AT mine is 0.2m. [These claims are not substantiated with source references.]
The reasons for the accident were given as being because the mine was deeper than usual
and it was outside the cleared area. Also because it was plastic and difficult to detect. In
subsequent tests the Ebinger 420 was found incapable of detecting this type of mine when it
was held more that 0.07 metres away. The demining group decided to try to source a detector
sensitive enough to locate "non-metal" mines.
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